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Among the many reasons why banks are unique
1, the most important is certainly their 
ability to provide information. For example, a large body of financial literature shows 
that the value of firms increases when they obtain a new bank loan, consistent with 
the  view  that,  by  granting  a  loan,  banks  implicitly  disclose  part  of  the  private
information in their possession and provide a certification of the financial conditions of 
the borrowers
2.
However, the positive reaction of the firms stock prices to the announcement 
of new bank financing or loan renewal is an indirect proof of the banks unique ability 
to solve informational asymmetries by acting as delegated monitors (see, in particular, 
Diamond, 1984).  Indeed, banks can produce valuable information only to the extent 
that  they  can  ensure  its  reliability.  As  f irst suggested by Leland and Pyle (1977), 
thisresult can be achieved if lenders contribute with their own assets in funding the 
borrowers  that  they  have  screened. A more direct test of  banks ability  to solve 
informational asymmetries would consider the cost of credit as a function of banks' 
ability in its screening and monitoring activities.
1 For a recent and thorough survey on financial intermediation see Gorton and Winton (2002).
2 A number of studies found that capital markets react positively to the announcement that an 
enterprise has obtained new bank financing (James, 1987, and Lummer and McConnel, 1989). 
Furthermore, the reaction is stronger for smaller (Slovin et al., 1992) and more opaque firms 
(Best and Zhang, 1993), as it is to be expected if information disclosure by banks is more 
valuable for these categories of borrowers.  Dahiya et al. (2001), examining the information 
content  of  the  announcement  of  loan  sale  by  the  leading  bank,  found  a  negative  and 
significant  impact  on  the  borrowers  stock  returns  in  the  period  surrounding  the
announcement.3
In  this  paper  we  provide  such  a  direct  test,  measuring  whether  or  not  the 
certification  of  the  borrowers  financial  conditions  provided  by  an  arranger  of  a 
syndicated credit facility has an effect on the interest rate charged to the borrower.
A syndicated credit facility is a loan originated by one or more arrangers, which 
are in charge of the screening and monitoring activities. It is then split in brackets, 
possibly of  different  size,  and  offered  to  potential  subscribers,  which  take  upon
themselves  the  credit  risk  on  their  share  of  the  loan.  As  argued  by  Dennis  and
Mullineaux (2000), syndicated loans represent a hybrid of private and public debt. Like 
standard bank loans, they are much more flexible than public debt placements and are 
often tailored to the borrowers needs.
3 Like public debt placements, syndicated loans 
allow  borrowers  to  raise  large  amount  of  funds,  and  they  are  placed  among  a
potentially large number of institutions across the world, at harmonized conditions for 
all subscribers.
An  important  feature  of  the  syndication  process  is  the  relative  position  of 
arrangers with respect to borrowers. When a borrower is seeking for bidders for a 
facility, its interests are in conflict with those of the potential arranger. The former is 
on the buy side of the market, looking for the lowest possible price for the facility that 
it  needs;  the  latter  is  on  the  sell  side,  with  the  objective  of  maximizing  its  total
revenues.  Once  the  mandate  has  been  awarded,  the  borrower  and  the  arranger 
become instead partners in seeking a satisfactory result from the market placement. 
In  fact,  the  failure  of  the  deal  would  not  only  leave  the  borrower  without  funds,
harming its reputation, but it would also put at stake the standing of the arranger. The 
interest rate on the syndicated credit facility is therefore the equilibrium outcome of 
3 In fact, initially agreed credit conditions are often rearranged before the expiration of the debt 
contract. Furthermore, although syndicated credit facilities have a number of standardized 
characteristics, their portions are not traded in organized markets, and can be sold by lenders 
only when the original contract specifically provides for it.4
the conditions put forward by the arranger and those called for by the providers. 
Ceteris  paribus, the equilibrium interest rate on the loan will therefore reflect the 
degree of certification provided by the arranger. 
Of course, in order to use interest rates on syndicated credit facilities to test for 
the certification effect provided by the arrangers, one needs to identify a measure of 
this  effect  that  varies  across  operations.  Following  the  predictions  of  Gorton  and
Pennacchi (1995) for the case of loan sales, we assume that arrangers retaining a 
larger share of a syndicated facility have a greater incentive to evaluate and monitor 
their borrowers. Thus, if screening and monitoring reduce asymmetric information, 
these facilities should have, ceteris paribus, lower interest rates. 
In the empirical analysis we use a large data set provided by Dealogic Capital
Data, a company that monitors syndicated loans placed in the international markets. In 
particular, we use information on syndicated credit facilities granted to borrowers of 
over 80 countries between 1990 and 2001.
4 The results show asmall but significant
effect of risk retaining on the interest rate paid by borrowers, concentrated in the case 
of small facilities. 
An alternative explanation of a negative relationship between the share retained 
by the arranger and the interest rate on a syndicated loan might be that providers are 
not  willing  to  subscribe  facilities  with  a  too  high  riskto  return  ratio,  forcing  the
arrangers to retain larger shares simply to avoid a syndication failure (to have a dog, 
in  the  practitioners  jargon).  We  control  for  this  alternative  possibility,  finding  no
evidence that it drives our results.
4 Although recently a number of studies have analyzed the factors influencing a banks choice 
to syndicate a loan, not much attention has been paid to the effects of the composition of the 
syndicate on the pricing of credit facilities. Angbazo et al. (1998) and Dennis et al. (2001) are, to 
our knowledge, the only exceptions.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
institutional characteristics of the syndicated credit market, and the evidence already 
available on some of its major features. Section 3 presents the empirical model used 
for testing the effects of the arrangers degree of certification on the interest rates 
charged  on  credit  facilities.  The  following  section  describes  the  data  used  in  the 
empirical  analysis.  Section  5  presents  the  econometric  results.  The  final  section
concludes.
2 The  Market  for  Syndicated  Credit:  Institutional
Characteristics and Previous Evidence
The last ten years have witnessed a rapid growth of the market for syndicated credit 
facilities in most countries. Between 1990 and 2001 the volume of facilities granted to 
private  firms  increasedmore  than  five  times,  topping  US  $1.6  trillion  in  2001.
According  to  Jones  et  al.  (2000),  in  the  US  syndicated  lending  represents
approximately half of  new loans to corporations, generating more underwriting fees 
than either the equity or the bond market. 
A syndicated credit facility is one offered to a single borrower by two or more 
banks,  which  sign  the  same  contract  and  stand  equally  in  right  of  repayment.
5
Although the terms and conditions of the contract are common for all members of the 
syndicate, each bank can choose the share to subscribe, and its legal position with 
respect to the borrower is independent from that of the other syndicate participants. In 
fact, the other participants have no legal duty to satisfy in its place the obligations 
eventually not fulfilled by a member of the syndicate.
5 A detailed description of the institutional features and practices of the syndicated credit 
market is provided by Rhodes et al. (2000).6
The  organization  of  a  syndicated  transaction  is  a  complex  process,
characterized by two principal phases. First, the borrower seeks potential bidders for 
the facility that it requires, either from relationship banks or from financial institutions 
acknowledged  as  market  leaders.  This  is  done  on  the  basis  of  a  set  of  specific 
conditions,  such  as  the  amount,  the  timing,  and  the  range  of  acceptable  rates.
Normally, borrowers prefer sole bidding, giving to the winning bank an unrestricted 
mandate to decide autonomously on the organization of the offer to the underwriters, 
the  distribution  of  roles  and  the  syndication  in  the  marketplace.  In  some  cases,
especially when a bidder seeks a fully underwritten bid for an amount that is too high 
for any institution to commit alone, a multi-bank bidding group is formed. At the end of 
this phase, the borrower mandates one or more banks to act as arrangers.
6
In the second phase, the syndication takes place and the characteristics of the 
credit facility are negotiated in detail. The arranger, in conjunction with the borrower, 
prepares and circulates within the potential underwriters an information memorandum, 
containing  the  summary  conditions  of  the  facility  and  the  information  on  the
borrowers activities and financial conditions. As the syndication progresses, terms 
and conditions are fully agreed with the borrower, and the arranger writes the final 
contract. Next, the arranger sends a letter inviting all potential subscribers to adhere to 
the syndicate at the terms and conditions specified by the contract.
7 When all potential 
participants  have  responded,  the  books  are  closed  and credit is allocated. The 
signing ceremony ends the process.
6 For expositional simplicity, in the following we will consider only the case of a single arranger. 
Unless  it  is  explicitly  mentioned,  the  same  considerations  apply  in  the  case  of  multiple 
arrangers.
7 In the case of multiple arrangers, one of them, designated as the book-runner, fulfills this 
duty.7
The  complex  interplay  of  interests  within  credit  syndicates  is  analyzed  in  a 
number of papers. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) concentrate on the determinants of a 
banks decision to syndicate a credit facility, showing that syndication is more likely to 
happen when information on the borrower are more transparent, when the arranger 
has stronger lending relationships with the borrower and when the facility has longer 
maturity. Lee and Mullineaux (2001) find that when the arranger is more reputable 
and the borrower is less risky and less informationally opaque, syndicates tend to be 
larger and more diffuse.
Credit syndicates share a number of features with loan sales, but they differ in 
one  fundamental aspect. While loan sales do not transfer the obligations between 
theacquiring bank and the borrower, credit syndicates establish from the beginning a 
direct  relationship  between  subscribers  and  borrowers.  As  such,  syndicated  loans 
address the same problems that typically motivate loan sales (e.g., avoiding regulatory 
limits,  reducing  asset  concentration,  and  lowering  funding  costs),  while  providing
stronger guarantees to the subscribers.
Indeed, as in the case of loan sales, incentive compatible arrangements that 
guarantee sufficient screening and monitoring activities can be found along the lines 
suggested by Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), who show that by retaining a portion of 
loan,  the  bank  could  reduce  agency  problem  since  it  continues  to  face  a  partial
incentive to maintain the loans value. The greater the portion of the loan held by the 
bank, the greater will be its incentive to evaluate and monitor the borrower. As a 
result, banks will sell a smaller fraction of more risky loans.
8
8 Gorton and Winton (2002) draw the attention to the paradoxical behavior of firms that in order 
to raise funds borrow from a bank which then sells the loans cash flows to investors in the 
capital  markets,  instead  of  directly  issuing  a  security.  This  paradox  applies  also  to  credit 
syndicates, but in a milder form, because credit syndicates entail a direct relationship between 8
A number of papers analyze the factors affecting the share of the loan retained 
by the arranger, confirming the theoretical prediction of Gorton and Pennacchi (1995). 
Simons  (1993),  analyzing  data  from  the  1991  Shared  National  Credit  Program  on
syndicated loans, finds that arrangers retained on average 17,4 per cent of loans that 
were subsequently classified by regulators as pass, 30,5 per cent of those classified 
as  substandard  and  47,3  per  cent  for  those  classified  as  loss.Dennis  and
Mullineaux  (1994)  show  that  more reputable arrangers are able to sell off larger 
portions of syndicated loans, and interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis 
that the arrangers status is a certification of theborrowers financial conditions. Jones
et al. (2000) show that the average loan share retained by the arranger increases with 
measures of its riskiness, such as its maturity.
9 Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) show 
that arrangers typically hold a larger proportion of information-problematic loans in 
their own portfolios.
Angbazo et al.  (1998) analyze the effect of syndication on loan interest rates. 
Their major finding is that credit spreads on syndicated highly leveraged transaction 
loans (HLT),
10 have lower yield spreads than other HLT loans, providing evidence in 
favor of  the hypothesis that better risk diversification among a pool of borrowers 
reduces the cost of credit. Dennis et al. (2001) find a similar result. Finally, Angbazo 
the  borrower  and  the  subscriber. In a sense, credit syndicates can be seen as an implicit 
underwriting agreement by part of the subscribers.
9 They also find that, although arrangers retain a larger portion of their lower-quality loans, 
some banks specialize in the lower end of the credit spectrum, and these banks syndicate a 
larger share of their low-quality loans.
10 These are defined as all loan financing used for buyouts, acquisitions and recapitalizations; 
all loan financing which double the borrowers liabilities and result in a leverage ratio higher 
than 50 per cent or increase the leverage ratio higher than 75 per cent; all loan financing that 
are designed as HLT by the syndication agent and all loan financing to subsidiaries of HLT 
companies.9
et al. (1998) also find that spreads on syndicated HLT loans are lower when the 
arranger retains the largest share among all providers.
3 Certification  Effects  in  the  Pricing  of  Syndicated
Credit: The Empirical Model
3.1 The identification of the pricing effect of certification
Arrangers can signal the soundness of the borrowers financial conditions by retaining 
a larger share of the credit facilities that they organize. In the case of loan sales, 
Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) argue that a bank planning to sell the loan does fewer 
screening  and  monitoring  than  what  would  be  desirable.  However,  by  retaining a 
fraction of the loan, it can give itself a stronger incentive to screen and monitor the 
borrower, thus mitigating the agency problems. As a result, the sale price is lower 
(and the implied interest rate is higher) when the selling bank retains a smaller share 
of the loan.
Clearly, the analysis by Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) is strongly related to that 
of agency problems within credit syndicates, suggesting that the degree of certification 
on the financial conditions of the borrower can be considered an increasing function of 
the share of the facility retained by the arranger (see also Dennis and Mullineaux, 
2000). Under this hypothesis, given all other characteristics, syndicated credit facilities 
with a larger share retained by the arranger should have lower interest rates. Further, 
the certification effect should be stronger in the case of credit facilities of smaller size, 
because larger loans are made to larger companies, which typically provide more 
transparent information on their financial conditions than smaller borrowers (see, e.g., 
Berger and Udell, 2002). 10
As  we  argued  before,there  is  an  alternative  explanation  for  a  negative
relationship between the share of the loan retained by the arranger and its interest 
rate. In the case of facilities with a too high risk to return ratio, providers could be 
unwilling to subscribe the loan, forcing the arrangers to retain a large share simply to 
avoid  a  syndication  failure  (to  have  a  dog).  We  discriminate  between  the
certification effect and this alternative explanation using the average providers share 
of the facility as a measure of the syndicates success. In fact, for a given loan size, 
an  unsuccessful  syndicate  is  less  likely  to  be  subscribed  by  a  large  number  of
providers.
One problem with this identification strategy is that arrangers address adverse 
selection problems by keeping syndicates small and more concentrated, presumably to 
enhance  incentives  to  monitor  (Lee  and  Mullineaux,  2001);  the  more  so  when
borrowers are more risky and informationally opaque. It could therefore be the case 
that a small syndicate is not a failure at all. We address this potential problem by 
testing for the certification effect in a sample of small facilities   those for which 
certification is more valuable  with a large number of providers. Indeed, although it is 
not necessarily the case that facilities with a small number of providers are potential 
failures, it is very unlikely that a syndicate with a large number of subscribers is a 
failure. Therefore, if the negative relationship between the share of the loan retained 
by the arranger and its interest rate is found also for this sample of small facilities 
underwritten  by  a  large  number  of  providers,  we  can  be  confident  that  such
relationship is due to the certification effect, and not on the arrangers willingness to 
avoid a potential syndication failure.
The  degree  of  certification  is  also  likely  to  be  a  function  of  the  arrangers 
reputation, which would be put at stake if it did not fulfill carefully to its screening and 
monitoring duties. However, reputation does not depend uniquely on the certification 
ability. In addition to truthful reporting of the financial conditions of the borrowers, 11
arrangers could have built in the past a superior standing for their skills  in fulfilling 
other duties related with their position, such as bookkeeping. Both these effects work 
in favor of lower interest rates for borrowers, but only the first reflects certification. 
Moreover, highly reputed banks might also exploit their market power imposing higher 
interest rates to their borrowers (see, e.g., John et al., 2001). The overall pricing effect 
induced by the three factors related with reputation   certification ability, managerial 
skill and market power   is therefore ambiguous, and  it depends on whether the 
market power or the efficiency effect prevails.
11
Given the difficulty in disentangling the overall effect of reputation, we will use 
the arrangers share of the market for syndicated credit facilities (which, according to 
previous literature, is a proxy for its reputation) as a control variable. Of course, by 
doing  so  we  somewhat  underestimate  the  overall  pricing  effect  of  certification.
However, if there was a significant effect on the interest rate even within the sample 
of  syndicates  arranged  by  more  reputed  banks,  we  could  argue  that  certification
provided  by  retention  of  a  larger  share  of  the  facility  by  part  of  the  arranger  is 
complementary to that associated with a stronger reputation.
Finally, a number of credit facilities, mainly those of larger size, are arranged by 
more than one bank, making it difficult to identify the degree of certification. For this 
reason,  in  the  following  we  concentrate  our  attention  on  syndicates  with  a  single 
arranger.
11 Focarelli and Panetta (2002) address a related issue, i.e. the change in market prices induced 
by consolidation in commercial banking, which also depends on whether the market power or 
the efficiency effect prevails.12
3.2 Control variables
The  effect of the arrangers ability to certify the borrowers financial conditions is 
correctly identified if all the other determinants of the interest rate on a syndicated 
credit facility are controlled for.
12 In choosing what factors influence interest rates, we
go along with the previous literature, interpreting the loan contract as a contingent 
claim that can be priced using option pricing techniques (Smith, 1980). This permits to 
give sound motivations for including, among the determinants of the interest rate on a 
bank loan, characteristics such as its size, its duration, the presence of a collateral, the 
variability  of  the  borrowers  assets,  and  to  attribute  to  the  coefficient  of  these
variables an expected sign.
In order to control for the characteristics of the credit facility, we also include in 
the pricing regression dummies related to loan purpose, loan rating, type of contract, 
margin type, currency of denomination and market where the facility is launched. 
Furthermore, we include dummies to account for subordinated credit facilities and for 
the presence of options allowing time extensions and renegotiations. On the part of the 
lenders,  we  control  for  the  members  possibility  to  sell  part  of  the  loan  on  the
secondary market and for privately placed deals  (club deals). Finally, we introduce 
time dummies to account for common macroeconomic characteristics.
12 Indeed, if we didnt control for the other determinants of the interest rate we would probably 
find a positive relationship between the share retained by the arranger and the interest rate on 
of the loan. In fact, syndicated facilities granted to riskier borrowers have both higher interest 
rates and a larger share of the loan retained by the arranger.13
3.3 Econometric setup and identification strategy
Following  the  approach  of  Booth  (1992),  the  effect  on  the  interest  rate  of  the
certification provided by the arranger is estimated using the following regression:
iijt = f(Xij, Di, Zj, Tt),  (1)
where iijt is the interest rate on a credit facility granted by bank i to borrower j at time 
t, Xijt is a set of characteristics of the credit facility (e.g., credit rating, currency of 
denomination, etc.),  Di is a set of dummy variables for each bank  i, Zj is a set of 
characteristics for borrower j and Tt are time dummies. The model is estimated using 
ordinary  least  squares.  Robust  standard  errors  are  calculated  using  t he procedure 
suggested by White (1980).
We adopt the following identification strategy. First, we test for the pricing 
effect of the share of the facility retained by the arranger (our proxy for certification), 
controlling for the share of the loan that is placed with each provider (a proxy of the 
degree  of  success  of  the  syndicate)  and  for  the  arrangers  market  share  for
syndicated credit facilities (a proxy of the arrangers reputation). Second, we check 
that the pricing effect of the arrangers retained  share of the facility is stronger in the 
case of credit facilities of smaller size (following Gande et al., 1999, those below US 
$75 million), as it should be the case if certification is more valuable for smaller and 
more  opaque  borrowers.  Third,  we  verify  that  in  the  case  of  smaller-size credit 
facilities the pricing effect of the share retained by the arranger does not vanish when 
we consider a sub-sample of facilities for which the average providers share is below 
the median, as it would be the case if our results were due to the arrangers willingness 
to avoid a potential syndication failure. Finally, we check that the certification effect is 
still  present  for  smaller  facilities  arranged  by  market  leaders,  in  contrast  to  the
hypothesis  that  a  more  reputable  arranger  can  offer  a  valuable  certification  of
borrowers financial conditions even without retaining a larger portion of the loan.14
4 Data and summary statistics
The empirical analysis is conducted using Loanware, a commercial data set provided 
by Dealogic Capital Data and recording the large majority of transactions for which 
information  is  public.  Our  sample  includes  information  on  14,121  credit  facilities
organized by a single arranger between 1990 and 2001, and where the interest rate is 
expressed as a spread over the LIBOR. 
The distribution of syndicates by size and borrowers nationality, presented in 
table 1, sheds some light on the structure of the market. The distribution by size is 
skewed  to  the  left  (the  top  quartile  accounts  for  the  three  quarters of the market 
volume). Credit facilities of smaller size (less than US $75 million) represent 56 per 
cent of the total number of contracts, but they account for only 11 per cent of the 
credit volume. Facilities with a size of more than US $500 million are 6 per cent of the 
total number of contracts, 45 percent of the volume of credit.
Credit syndicates are very common for borrowers from the United States and 
the United Kingdom. The two markets account, respectively, for 80 and 5 per cent of 
the total number of contracts, and for 76 and 8 percent of the credit volume (table 1). 
Although loan size is almost uniformly distributed across borrower nationalities, the 
share of credit allocated to Japanese and German firms through facilities amounting to 
US $500 million or more is 77 and 84 per cent, respectively. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of credit facilities by maturity and loan purpose. 
About 15 per cent of the contracts (almost one quarter of the total volume of credit) 
has a duration of less than one year; 55 per cent (47 per cent) between one and three 
years. Only 2 per cent of the facilities, both as number of transactions and as volume 
of credit, has maturity of more than 5 years.
Excluding the facilities for which the purpose is not recorded, the largest share 
of the market is represented by operations for refinancing or debt repayments (48.2 15
per  cent  of  the  number  of  contracts  and  49.6  of  the  credit  volume);  next  are
operations financing working capital (17.8 per cent and 9.5 per cent, respectively) and 
acquisitions (13.1 and 15.9 per cent). LBO and MBO related facilities represent only 
3.3 percent of the number of contracts and 3.2 of the credit volume. The largest 
facilities are those supporting a corporate promissory note (i.e. standby facilities), with 
an average loans size of US $622 million, followed by the acquisition finance facilities 
(233 million).
Summary statistics for the dependent variable and the most relevant regressors 
used in the econometric analysis are presented in panel A of table 3. Syndicated credit 
facilities have an average spread of 162 basis points over the LIBOR, with a standard 
deviation of 96 basis points. The drawn return, which is the annual return (excluding 
up-front  fees)
13  that  will  accrue  to  a  senior  provider  if the facility is fully drawn 
throughout  its  life,  is  only  one  basis  point  higher.  The  size  of  credit  facilities  is 
extremely variable, ranging from 200,000 to 15 billions of US dollars, with an average 
value of 165 millions and a median value of 65. 
Data on the share of the credit facility retained by the arranger and on the 
average  providers  bracket  size  is  available  for  only  2,951  contracts,  limiting
significantly the size of the sample that can be used in the econometric analysis testing 
for the certification effect. However, the summary statistics for this sample, presented 
in panel B, are quite similar to those of the larger one. The average size of the facility 
is US $178 million (165 in the larger sample) and the average spread is 147 basis 
points (162 in the larger sample). On average, 30 per cent of the facility is retained by 
the arranger and 22 per cent of the remaining part is subscribed by each provider.
13 The up-front fees are paid directly by the borrower to the arranger and only in very few cases 
are recorded in the database.16
In the case of smaller facilities (those with a value of US $75 million or less), 
the average share retained by the arranger is larger, the interest rate is higher and the 
duration is shorter. Smaller facilities are typically allocated among fewer providers, but 
with larger shares. Syndicate credit facilities arranged by one of the three market
leaders are on average larger, have more providers and have shorter maturity.
14 They 
are also characterized by smaller shares retained by the arranger and the providers.
These  findings  are  consistent  with  two  of  our  hypotheses.  First,  facilities
granted to smaller, more opaque borrowers require a stronger certification by part of 
the  arranger.  Second,  market  leaders  can  afford  to  retain  a  smaller  share  of  the 
facility, because they supply certification by means of their higher reputation. More 
rigorous tests of these and our other hypotheses will be presented in the next section. 
5 Results of the Econometric Analysis
The econometric analysis is initially conducted on a sample of 14,121 credit syndicates 
organized  by  a  single  arranger.  Although  data  on  the  share of the credit facility 
retained by the arranger and on that subscribed by each provider are available only for 
2,951 syndicates, the reduction in the sample size does not seem to bias the results. 
Panels A and B of table 4 show that the estimates on the larger sample and those on 
the  smaller  sample  are  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  similar.  Furthermore,  even
introducing the two additional variables for the arrangers and the providers shares, 
the coefficients of the other variables are virtually unchanged. In all three cases the 
predictive power of the regression is fairly good, with corrected R-squared ranging 
from 0.42 for the regression on the larger sample to 0.50 for that on the smaller 
14 That of the three largest arrangers is an obvious choice, as their market sharers represent, 
respectively, 20, 14 and 12 per cent of the total value of syndicated credit facilities, while the 17
sample. In light of these results, in the following we concentrate only on the smaller 
sample.
5.1 Discussion of Control variables
As discussed in section 3, in estimating the arrangers ability to provide certification on 
the borrowers financial conditions we control for a number of factors influencing the 
interest rates on the credit facilities.
Table  5  reports  the  coefficients  of  the  most  interesting  control  variables.
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Consistent with Angbazo et al. (1998) and Booth (1992), larger loans have a lower 
interest rate. Several factors can account for this effect. In particular, large loans are 
usually granted to large borrowers, which typically have a lower default risk, stronger 
fourth larger arranger has a market share of 2 per cent.
15  The  unreported  control  variables  follow  these  patterns.  The  time  dummies  match  the 
evolution of the syndicate loan market in the period 1990-2001, as described by Rhodes et al. 
(2000). In the first part of the 90s we observe an increase in loan prices, possibly due to the 
surge in risk associated with the economic recession experienced by most developed countries,
and the losses experimented by major US banks. In the central part of the 90s banks increased 
their capital, favoring an expansion in credit supply that resulted in a two years decline in 
prices, in 1994 and 1995. Starting from 1997, the strong increase in acquisition activities and the 
effects of the Asian financial crisis caused a new surge in prices that lasted until 2001. As 
expected,  loans  with  better  credit  ratings  have  lower  interest  rates.  The  difference  in  the 
interest rates between A and CC rated is about 115 basis points. On average the interest rate 
level is lower for borrowers that operate in the energy and oil sectors, in the insurance sector 
and  for  holding  companies.  It  is  higher  for  borrowers  active  in  more  innovative  sectors 
(broadcasting, cable TV, telecommunications, media) and sectors that are highly sensible to 
changes in the economical and political conditions (hotels and leisure, aerospace and defense, 
construction).  Facilities  granted  for  acquisition  activities  exhibit  a  22  basis points positive 
spread with respect to those with operations refinancing purpose. The same spread raises to 32 
basis  points  for  facilities  granted  for  DIP-financing,  and  to  almost  80  basis  points  for 
LBO/MBOs. On the contrary, facilities used to finance the purchase of vessels or to support a 
corporate promissory note have the lowest interest rates. This results, consistent with the 
findings in Booth (1992) and Angzabo et al. (1998), corroborates the view that banks extract the 18
bargaining power with the banks and more transparent financial conditions. Moreover, 
the syndication activity could exhibit some degree of increasing returns to scale.
Short-term  loans  have  lower  interest  rates.  This  is  consistent  with  the
predictions of Flannery (1986), who suggests that longer maturity loans have a higher 
probability of default, and Diamond (1991), who shows that high risk firms choose 
longer maturity facilities in order to reduce refinancing risk. Furthermore, as suggested 
by Coleman et al. (2001), short-term facilities could reduce potential agency problems 
within the syndicate, imposing a more frequent monitoring of the behavior of both the 
borrower by part of the arranger, and of the arranger by part of the providers.
Consistent with the findings of the previous literature, interest rates on secured 
credit facilities are on average 40 basis points higher than on unsecured ones. As 
suggested  by  previous  analyses,  this  evidence  supports  the  hypothesis  that  banks 
require guarantees on riskier loans.
16
Credit facilities in which the subscribers are allowed to transfer part of the loan 
on the secondary market have relatively lower  interest rates, in harmony with the 
hypothesis  that  this  option  favors  the  lenders,  while  it  may  harm  the  borrower.
Subordinated facilities have higher interest rates, so as to compensate the lenders for 
the higher credit risk. The coefficient of the dummy controlling for the renegotiation of 
an existing loan is not significantly different from zero. Privately placed facilities (club 
deals) have lower interest rates, possibly because they are underwritten within groups 
of borrowers with stronger relationships, where agency problems are lower. Finally, 
and quite surprisingly, the existence of an option to extend the size or the maturity of 
highest yields in riskier  transactions and those where the borrower needs quick financing 
(Megginson et al., 1995).
16 For a discussion of this issue see, among others, Smith and Warner (1979), Berger and Udell 
(1990), John et al. (2000).19
the facility has a significant negative effect on the interest rate, despite the fact that it 
favors the borrower.
5.2 Discussion of Test Variables
The  results  reported  in  panel  C  of  table  4  show  that  the  degree  of  certification
provided by the arranger has a significant effect on the interest rate charged on a 
syndicated credit facility. The coefficient of thelogarithm of the share of the facility 
retained  by  the  arranger,  our  proxy  for  certification,  is  -7.4 and it is significantly 
different from zero at the 1 per cent level. An arranger increasing its retained share 
by one standard deviation from the average value (from 30 to 49 per cent, see table 3) 
gains for the borrower a lower spread with respect to the LIBOR of almost 5 basis 
points. These price changes are not huge, but the gains for borrowers are not trivial: 
for a facility of 85 million (the median amount) fully drawn during the median maturity 
of 4 years, they sum to US $170,000.
The coefficient of the dummy for the three arrangers with the largest market 
shares is -5, and it is only borderline significant at the 10 per cent level, suggesting that 
among the three effects related with reputation  certification ability, managerial skill 
and market power  the first two prevail.
Further, the coefficient of the share of the credit facility subscribed by each 
provider (expressed in log value) is positive and significantly different from zero at the 
5 per cent level. This result confirms that the arrangers capable of placing a facility 
within  a  larger  number  of  providers  indeed  gain  lower  interest  rates  for  their
borrowers:  the  marginal  effect  when  the  providers  share  shrinks by one standard 
deviation from the average value (from 22 per cent to 6 per cent) is slightly less than 5 
basis points.20
Overall these results find support in favor of the main hypothesis of the paper, 
that arrangers providing a higher degree of certification of the financial conditions of 
the borrowers obtain lower interest rates for their clients.
5.3 Result of Sub-samples
It is widely agreed that the financial conditions of small firms are far less transparent 
than  those  of  large,  possibly  public  companies. The certification that an arranger 
provides by retaining a larger share of a syndicated credit facility is therefore likely to 
be more valuable in the case of facilities of lower size, which are typically granted to 
smaller borrowers. For these facilities, the effect of certification on the equilibrium 
interest rate should therefore be stronger. In order to test this hypothesis, we split our 
sample  into  two  sub-samples,  according  to  the  size  of  the  facility.
17 The results, 
reported in table 5, indicate that for smaller facilities the coefficient of the share of the 
loan retained by the arranger is -13.75 (and it is significantly different from zero at the 
1 per cent level, panel A). An arranger increasing its retained share by one standard 
deviation from the average (from 40 to 58 per cent, table 3), gains for the borrower a 
lower spread with respect to the LIBOR of slightly more than 6 basis points. For a 
facility of $42 millions (the median amount) fully drawn during the median maturity of 
3 years, the gains for borrowers sum to US $76,000.
 On the contrary, for larger facilities the pricing effect of certification is not 
significantly different from zero. Moreover, the difference between the coefficients 
for  smaller  and  larger  loans  is  significant  at  the  5 per cent level (panel C). This 
evidence  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  the  certification  provided  by  an
17 As before, we follow Gande et al. (1999) considering small facilities those with a value of less 
than US $ 75 million.21
arranger of a syndicated credit facility is not important in the case of larger operations, 
typically granted to borrowers with more transparent financial conditions.
As already said, it is possible that in the case of facilities with a too high risk to 
return ratio, the difficulty to find underwriters might force the arrangers to retain a 
large share in order to avoid a syndication failure (to have a dog). In order to control 
for this alternative explanation of the negative relationship between the share of the 
loan retained by the arranger and its interest rate, we analyze two sub-samples of 
syndicates that are most likely to be successful. First, assuming that a syndicate with a 
large number of subscribers is very unlikely to be a potential failure, we estimate 
equation (1) on a sample of small facilities (those with total value below US $ 75 
million) in which the average share of each provider is below the median (22.7 per 
cent). The results, reported in Panel B of table 6, show that the coefficient of the 
arrangers  retained  share  remains  negative  and  significantly  different  from  zero.
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Second, we consider a sub-sample of facilities arranged  by one of the three market 
leaders, judging that these banks are less likely to organize potential failures. The 
results, reported in panel A of table 6, show that also in this case the coefficient of the 
share of the loan retained by the arranger is negative and significantly different from 
zero.
19
The results of the estimates on the two samples of credit syndicates that are 
less likely to be potential failures confirm that the negative coefficient of the share of 
the  loan  retained  by  the  arranger  is  indeed a measure of the certification effect 
provided through risk retention. 
18 In an unreported regression we also verified that the coefficient for the arrangers retained 
share is not statistically different from that obtained for the sub-sample of facilities with an
above the median providers share.22
Finally,  although  this  effect  cannot  be  distinguished  from  that  coming  from
superior  managerial  abilities,  market  leaders  might  provide  additional  certification
because they put at stake their more valuable reputation. However, the results of the 
estimates on the sub-sample of facilities arranged by the three market leaders show 
that, at most, this effect is complementary to that coming from risk retention.
6 Conclusions
In  this  paper  we  have  provided  a  direct  test  of  banks  unique  ability to mitigate 
informational asymmetries, by verifying  whether syndicated loans in which a larger 
share of the facility is retained by the arranger are considered less risky by providers, 
and  therefore  have  lower  interest  rates.  Following  the  predictions  of  Gorton  and
Pennacchi (1995) for the case of loan sales, we have assumed that the degree of 
certification provided by the arranger is an increasing function of the share of the 
facility that it retains. Indeed, the larger is the share of credit risk held by the arranger, 
the greater will be its incentive to evaluate and monitor the borrower. 
Our empirical results confirm the presence of a certification effect, showing 
that  syndicated  facilities  in  which  t he arranger retains a larger share have, ceteris 
paribus, lower interest rates. We also found evidence that such a certification effect is 
larger for smaller, potentially more opaque syndicated credit facilities, supporting the 
view that banks play a more  valuable role in screening and monitoring the financial 
conditions of smaller and less reputable borrowers. 
Our results do not vanish when we control for an alternative explanation of the 
negative relationship between the share of the facility retained by the arranger and the 
19 Indeed, its absolute value is even larger than that estimated in the unreported regression on 
the  sample  of  facilities  arranged  by  non-leading  banks,  although  the  difference  is  not 23
interest rate charged on the loan, namely that in the case of facilities with a high risk 
to return ratio, providers will not be willing to subscribe the loan, forcing the arrangers 
to  retain  a  large  share  in  order  to  avoid  a  syndication failure (to have a dog). 
Moreover, we found evidence of a significant certification effect of a larger retained 
share also in the case of larger, more reputable arrangers.
However, in the case of larger loans (which represent less than half of the total
number of facilities but ninety per cent of the total value of syndicated credits), we 
found no certification effect of a larger share retained by the arranger. For these 
facilities,  typically  granted  to  borrowers  with  more  transparent  financial  conditions,
interest  rates  appear  to  be  fully  accounted  for  by  observable  borrower- and deal-
specific characteristics. The reasons for the success of syndicated credit facilities of 
larger size as a substitute for the issue of public debt is therefore to be found in other 
characteristics, such as their flexibility and timeliness.
statistically significant.Table 1
Syndicated Loans by Borrowers Nationality and Size
(columns: size of loan; rows: borrowers nationality)
The table refers to all credit facilities with a single arranger and for which it is available the information on the return 
expressed as a spread over the London Interbank offered rate (Libor). Amount is expressed in million of U.S. dollars; the 
number of facilities in units. In parenthesis are reported the ratios of totals across rows. 
? ?  $25,000
> $25,000 and ? ?
$75,000
> $75,000 and ? ?
$150,000
> $150,000 and 
? ?  $250,000
> $250,000 and 
? ?  $500,000
> $500,000 Total
Amt. 400 (1) 2061 (4) 8035 (16) 6262 (12) 7745 (15) 25970 (51) 50472
Canada
# 28 (13) 42 (19) 70 (32) 32 (15) 22 (10) 26 (12) 220
Amt. 87 (0) 1216 (6) 2764 (13) 1977 (9) 2564 (12) 12596 (59) 21204
France
# 5 (6) 27 (30) 24 (27) 11 (12) 8 (9) 15 (17) 90
Amt. 97 (0) 444 (1) 1602 (5) 2157 (6) 3358 (10) 25546 (77) 33203
Germany
# 7 (10) 9 (13) 14 (20) 11 (16) 10 (14) 18 (26) 69
Amt. 203 (1) 1353 (10) 1661 (12) 2659 (19) 3260 (24) 4542 (33) 13677
Italy
# 12 (14) 29 (35) 16 (19) 14 (17) 8 (10) 5 (6) 84
Japan Amt. 57 (0) 165 (1) 1484 (5) 1546 (6) 1051 (4) 23268 (84) 27571
# 4 (8) 4 (8) 15 (29) 8 (16) 3 (6) 17 (33) 51
Amt. 690 (0) 7778 (4) 19081 (10) 25212 (14) 42407 (23) 89959 (49) 185126 United
Kingdom # 57 (8) 151 (21) 175 (25) 130 (18) 118 (17) 76 (11) 707
Amt. 41957 (2) 174299 (10) 248625 (14) 214666 (12) 305638 (17) 786236 (44) 1771421 United
States # 3007 (27) 3553 (32) 2205 (20) 1058 (9) 844 (7) 609 (5) 11276
Amt. 5868 (3) 24244 (11) 41240 (19) 32251 (15) 44382 (20) 73586 (33) 221572 Other
countries # 400 (25) 499 (31) 369 (23) 161 (10) 129 (8) 66 (4) 1624
Amt. 49358 (2) 211559 (9) 324492 (14) 286730 (12) 410404 (18) 1041702 (45) 2324246
Total
# 3520 (25) 4314 (31) 2888 (20) 1425 (10) 1142 (8) 832 (6) 14121Table 2
Syndicated Loans by Loan Purpose and Maturity
(columns: Class of original maturity; rows: loan purpose)
The table refers to all credit facilities with a single arranger and for which it is available the information on the return 
expressed as a spread over the London Interbank offered rate (Libor). Amount is expressed in million of U.S. dollars; the 
number of facilities in units.  In parenthesis are reported the ratios of totals across rows.
0-12 Months 12-36 Months 36-60 Months 60+ Months Unknown Total
Amt. 104248 (53) 76568 (39) 10972 (6) 1140 (1) 2994 (2) 195922 Standby/
CP support # 132 (42) 149 (47) 14 (4) 2 (1) 18 (6) 315
Amt. 58776 (35) 80117 (47) 9962 (6) 200 (0) 21266 (12) 170322 Working capital/ 
Gen. Corporate # 386 (23) 1011 (61) 87 (5) 1 (0) 173 (10) 1658
Amt. 194914 (22) 504621 (57) 144892 (16) 2620 (0) 45688 (5) 892736 Refinancing / 
Debt Repayment  # 571 (13) 2908 (65) 670 (15) 16 (0) 331 (7) 4496
Amt. 1796 (2) 13604 (18) 28860 (37) 30803 (40) 2372 (3) 77435
Project financing
# 16 (4) 110 (26) 170 (40) 112 (26) 20 (5) 428
Amt. 73002 (26) 129973 (45) 71112 (25) 816 (0) 10929 (4) 285831
Acquisition
# 173 (14) 644 (53) 327 (27) 9 (1) 73 (6) 1226
Amt. 1791 (3) 8612 (15) 43965 (75) 2471 (4) 1476 (3) 58316
LBO / MBO
# 6 (2) 71 (23) 209 (69) 3 (1) 16 (5) 305
Amt. 21508 (18) 54537 (45) 27099 (22) 7266 (6) 10195 (8) 120606
Others
# 117 (13) 439 (49) 188 (21) 62 (7) 95 (11) 901
Amt. 101451 (19) 222486 (43) 67830 (13) 1815 (0) 129498 (25) 523078
Unknown
# 713 (15) 2420 (51) 542 (11) 17 (0) 1100 (23) 4792
Amt. 557485 (24) 1090518 (47) 404693 (17) 47132 (2) 224418 (10) 2324246
Total
# 2114 (15) 7752 (55) 2207 (16) 222 (2) 1826 (13) 14121Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A refers to all credit facilities with a single arranger and for which the return is expressed as a 
spread over the London Interbank offered rate (Libor). Panel B refers to all credit facilities with a single 
arranger where the fraction retained by the arranger is available. Panel B presents two sample-splits.
The first refers to credit facility with amount <= (>) $75 million; the second refers to credit facilities
where the arranger is (is not) one of the top 3 leaders in the market. Drawn return is the annual return 
expressed in basis point over the Libor that will accrue to a senior provider if the facility is fully drawn 
throughout its life. Spread is the margin expressed in basis point over the Libor. Amount is expressed
in million of US dollars. Number of providers is the number of institutions that have participated in a 
facility as a provider of funds (including the arranger). Amount per provider is expressed in million of 
U.S. dollars. The providers share (when available) is the fraction of funds provided on average by the 
providers (excluding the arranger). The arrangers share (when available) is the fraction of funds 
provided by the arranger. Maturity is expressed in months.
Variables Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: All Credit Facilities with mono arranger
Drawn return  14121 150.0 163.1 95.7 17.0 450.0
Spread 14121 150.0 161.7 95.5 16.6 450.0
Amount 14121 65.0 164.6 424.1 0.2 15000.0
Maturity (months) 12295 36.0 46.6 32.4 1.0 360.0
Panel B: Credit facilities with a single arranger and for which the information on the 
fraction retained by the arranger is available
Drawn return  2951 137.5 149.4 93.0 17.0 450.0
Spread 2951 130.0 147.2 92.3 17.0 450.0
Amount 2951 85.0 178.2 408.3 2.8 12000.0
Number of providers 2951 5.0 6.9 6.5 2.0 93.0
Providers share  2951 18.1 22.4 16.3 0.3 97.3
Arrangers share  2951 26.7 30.1 18.7 0.0 96.0
Maturity (months) 2818 48.0 48.8 28.8 1.0 321.0
Large credit facilities (amount > $75 million)
Drawn return  1580 105.0 132.6 92.4 17.0 450.0
Spread 1580 100.0 130.6 91.0 17.0 450.0
Amount 1580 160.0 296.2 530.2 75.3 12000.0
Number of provider 1580 8.0 9.8 7.6 2.0 93.0
Provider's share  1580 12.0 15.0 12.0 0.3 94.5
Arranger's share  1580 18.5 21.7 15.2 0.0 92.1
Maturity (months) 1507 59.0 52.2 31.0 1.0 321.0
Small credit facilities (amount <= $75 million)
Drawn return  1371 156.3 168.6 89.9 18.8 450.0
Spread 1371 150.0 166.4 90.2 18,8 450.0
Amount 1371 42.0 42.1 19.2 2,8 75.0
Number of providers 1371 3.0 3.7 2.2 2.0 25.0
Providers share  1371 27.2 30.9 16.5 2.2 97.3
Arrangers share  1371 40.0 39.7 17.6 0.0 96.0
Maturity (months) 1311 36.0 45.0 25.5 1.0 180.0
Small credit facilities where the providers share is below the sample median 
Drawn return  687 144.2 153.1 89.2 18.8 425.0
Spread 687 137.5 149.7 89.3 18.8 425.0
Amount 687 50.0 47.3 19.0 3.4 75.0
Number of providers 687 4.0 5.0 2.5 2.0 25.0
Providers share  687 19.2 18.5 5.3 2.2 27.2
Arrangers share  687 33.3 35.8 18.4 0.0 96.0
Maturity (months) 670 40.0 47.6 27.0 1.0 180.0
Small credit facilities where the arranger is one of the top 3 market leaders
Drawn return  332 150.0 168.5 91.0 22.5 450.0
Spread 332 150.0 166.8 90.4 22.5 450.0
Amount 332 50.0 45.5 19.2 6.0 75.0
Number of providers 332 3.0 3.7 2.3 2.0 6.0
Providers share  332 27.4 31.7 16.9 5.5 92.3
Arrangers share  332 40.0 39.8 17.7 4.3 92.9
Maturity (months) 315 36.0 42.7 32.5 1.0 120.0Table 4
Effect on Spreads 
Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (1) for the entire sample. Panel B reports the results of estimating 
equation (1) of the paper for facilities with mono arranger where the fraction retained by the arranger is available. 
Facility size is expressed in million of U.S. dollars. Top3 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the arranger is one 
of the top 3 leaders in the market. The providers share (when available) is the fraction of funds on average provided 
by  a  single  provider.  The  arrangers  share  (when  available)  is  the  fraction  of  funds  provided  by  the  a rranger.
Renegotiation is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the facility is a renegotiation of an existing facility and 0 
otherwise. Club is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the loan is sold on a club base and 0 otherwise. Transfer is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if it is possible for a syndicate member to transfer part of the loan on the 
secondary market and 0 otherwise. Secured is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the loan is backed by a specific 
assets or revenues of the borrower and 0 otherwise. Extension is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the facility 
provides an extension option. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** 
indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Sample where the Sample where the
Variables Entire sample Arrangers share  Arrangers share 
is available is available
Arrangers share -7.42 ***
(2.22)
Providers share  6.49 **
(3.14)
Top 3  -6.03 *** -4.96 -5.09 *
(1.43) (3.10) (3.10)
Facility size (log value) -11.29 *** -15.40 *** -15.67 ***
(0.60) (1.50) (2.15)
0-12 Months -30.17 *** -30.02 *** -30.31 ***
(2.93) (8.37) (8.39)
12-36 Months -14.18 *** -18.49 ** -17.95 **
(2.58) (7.46) (7.47)
36-60 Months 1.41 -2.17 -2.06
(3.08) (7.96) (7.97)
60+ Months -9.25 -29.89 ** -28.48 **
(5.90) (12.88) (13.09)
Renegotiation 13.44 29.77 27.79
(11.94) (18.51) (19.22)
Club -6.46 * -11.61 * -11.99 *
(3.46) (6.43) (6.42)




Extension -9.55 *** -17.19 *** -16.58 ***
(2.21) (3.71) (3.71)
Secured 39.20 *** 43.11 *** 42.48 ***
(1.64) (3.29) (3.29)
Constant 260.35 *** 271.27 *** 274.87 ***
(5.33) (14.68) (23.22)
No. of Observations 14,121 2,951 2,951
R-Square 0.419 0.496 0.500
Degrees of freedom 2,745 2,743Table 5
Robustness Check:
Effect on Spreads by Size of the Facility
Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (1) for small facilities (below US $75 million). Panel B reports the results of 
estimating equation (1) for large facilities (above US $75 million). In Panel C we report the value of an F-test on the significance of the 
difference of the coefficients for small and large facilities.  Facility size is expressed in million of U.S. dollars. Top3 is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the arranger is one of the top 3 leaders in the market. The providers share (when available) is the fraction 
of funds on average provided by a single provider. The arrangers share (when available) is the fraction of funds provided by the 
arranger. Renegotiation is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the facility is a renegotiation of an existing facility and 0 otherwise. 
Club is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the loan is sold on a club base and 0 otherwise. Transfer is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if it is possible for a syndicate member to transfer part of the loan on the secondary market and 0 otherwise. Secured is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1if the loan is backed by a specific assets or revenues of the borrower and 0 otherwise. Extension is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1if the facility provides an extension option. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 
per cent.
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
Variables Small Facilities
(Less than US $75 
million)
Large Facilities
(More than US $75 
million)
Difference Test
(Small vs. Large Facilities)
Arrangers share  -13.75 *** -2.80 4.84 **
(4.05) (2.90)
Providers share  5.68 1.78 0.35
(5.31) (3.97)
Top 3 -6.99 -3.43 0.29
(5.20) (4.08)
Facility size (log value) -15.20 *** -11.49 *** 0.51
(4.00) (3.32)
0-12 Months -31.78 ** -34.79 *** 0.03
(14.30) (10.92)
12-36 Months -19.83 -20.70 ** 0.00
(12.55) (10.13)
36-60 Months -14.38 2.71 0.99
(13.25) (10.99)
60+ Months -2.62 -21.24 0.40
(23.48) (18.14)
Renegotiation 43.91 44.20 * 0.00
(28.29) (23.18)
Club -2.48 -22.35 ** 2.01
(8.90) (10.80)
Transfer -14.27 *** -0.87 3.95 **
(5.07) (4.45)
Extension -11.51 * -18.32 *** 0.71
(6.63) (4.62)
Secured 44.78 *** 38.93 *** 0.73
(4.97) (4.70)
Constant 315.28 *** 242.22 *** 2.24
(38.37) (34.11)
No. of  Observations 1,371 1,580
R-Square 0,38 0,50
Degrees of freedom 1,185 1,393Table 6
Robustness Check:
Effect on Spreads by Arrangers Reputation and Providers Share 
in Small Facilities
Panel A reports the results of estimating equation (1) for small facilities (below US $75 million) where the arranger is 
one of the top 3 leaders in the market.  Panel B reports the results of estimating equation (1) for small facilities 
(facilities below US $75 million) where the providers share is below the sample median  (0.272). Facility size is 
expressed in million of U.S. dollars. The providers share (when available) is the fraction of funds on average provided 
by  a  single  provider.  The  arrangers  share  (when  available)  is  the  fraction  of  funds  provided  by  the  a rranger.
Renegotiation is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the facility is a renegotiation of an existing facility and 0 
otherwise. Club is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the loan is sold on a club base and 0 otherwise. Transfer is a 
dummy  variable  that takes value 1 if it is possible for a syndicate member to transfer part of the loan on the 
secondary market and 0 otherwise. Secured is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the loan is backed by a specific 
assets or revenues of the borrower and 0 otherwise. Extension is a dummy variable that takes value 1if the facility 
provides an extension option. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** 
indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
Variables Panel A Panel B
Facilities where the 
arranger is a market leader
Small Providers Share 
(below the sample median)
Arrangers share  -31.37 ** -11.66 **
(13.66) (4.94)




Facility size (log value) -35.45 *** -16.14 **
(10.33) (7.09)
0-12 Months -3.17 -41.63 *
(29.08) (23.05)
12-36 Months 9.58 -8.45
(26.51) (20.83)












Secured 49.38 *** 45.47 ***
(12.05) (8.37)
Constant 355.69 *** 377.58 ***
(102.28) (67.63)
No. Of  Observations 332 687
R-Square 0.35 0.41
Degrees of freedom 220 51730
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